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Abstract 
The current study aimed to assess whether individual differences in fluid intelligence, as 
measured by abstract reasoning, emotional intelligence, and the Big Five personality traits would 
predict susceptibility to the continued influence effect. A total of 29 undergraduate students at 
Brescia University College read a news story that contained both misinformation and a retraction 
and were then tested on that news story. Participants also completed three additional 
questionnaires measuring personality traits, emotional intelligence, and abstract reasoning. It was 
predicted that individuals with lower levels of fluid and emotional intelligence, as well as those 
who scored higher in neuroticism and extraversion would be the most susceptible to the 
continued influence effect. Results indicated that fluid intelligence, emotional intelligence, and 
the personality traits were not significant predictors of susceptibility to the continued influence 
effect, although individuals who exhibited higher levels of fluid intelligence were more likely to 
remember the retraction. 
Keywords: continued influence effect, individual differences, false information, 
personality, fluid intelligence, emotional intelligence   
The Effect of Individual Differences on the Continued Use of False Information: 
Intelligence and Personality  
Since the 1970’s, studies concerning the misinformation effect – when false information 
is incorporated into an existing memory of an event – have tried to understand the experimental 
conditions that enable an individual to be more susceptible to its effects (see Loftus, 2005 for a 
review). For example, one commonly recognized experimental condition that has been known to 
influence susceptibility to misinformation effects is the manipulation and passage of time 
(Loftus, 2005). In her review of the literature, Elizabeth Loftus (2005) explained that 
misinformation is more likely to incorporate into an individual’s memory of an event if the 
information is provided after the effects of time have allowed the original memory of the event to 
deteriorate. This was established in series of studies conducted by Loftus et al. (1978), in which 
half of the participants witnessed an accident that occurred at a stop sign while the other half 
witnessed the accident at a yield sign. Participants in the misinformation condition then 
completed a questionnaire that contained information inconsistent with the sign they had seen. 
Researchers found that participants provided with misinformation immediately after witnessing 
the event were significantly more likely to report seeing the wrong sign than participants who 
were given the misinformation two days or even a week later. Additionally, they found that 
participants who were tested weeks after witnessing the accident were also more likely to report 
seeing the wrong sign. These results suggest that the intervals of time between when the event is 
witnessed, when the misinformation is provided, and when the participant is tested are all crucial 
in understanding susceptibility to the misinformation effect.  
Another experimental condition that that influences susceptibility to misinformation is 
the effectiveness of misinformation warnings. For example, Greene et al. (1982) examined the 
effects of warnings by providing participants with warnings at varying periods of time to see if it 
would affect their reliance on false information. It was found that warnings given pre-
misinformation resulted in a slight increase in resistance against incorporating false information, 
however post-misinformation warnings had no effect at all. Additionally, Eakin et al (2003) 
explored resistance to warnings by manipulating how many times the participants were exposed 
to the misinformation, thus making the false information more or less cognitively accessible. He 
found that when participants were exposed to misinformation once (low accessibility), providing 
several warnings significantly reduced misinformation effects, whereas repeatedly seeing the 
misinformation (high accessibility) made participants more likely to ignore warnings and 
therefore more susceptible to misinformation.  
Other researchers have explored the effects of misinformation retractions, which have 
been found to create their own unique effect called the continued influence effect (CIE; Johnson 
& Seifert, 1994; Wilkes & Leatherbarrow, 1988; Ecker et al, 2011, 2014). The CIE occurs when 
an individual continues to use false information in thinking and reasoning processes even though 
it has been subsequently retracted or disproved (Johnson & Seifert, 1994; Wilkes & 
Leatherbarrow, 1988). The CIE is typically created and measured using a paradigm that was 
designed by Wilkes and Leatherbarrow (1988). Participants were provided with a fictitious story 
that contained misleading information, and then later in the story the misinformation was 
retracted. Next, participant’s understanding of the story was tested using an open-ended 
questionnaire, and the strength of the CIE was determined by how much the participants relied 
on the initial misinformation when answering the questions.  
Several studies have utilized this paradigm to understand the CIE (Johnson & Seifert, 
1994; Wilkes & Leatherbarrow, 1988; Ecker et al, 2011, 2014) and their findings have led to the 
development of two models that attempt to explain its cause. First, in their review of the 
literature, Lewandowsky et al. (2012) report that the way an individual develops and updates 
their mental models could explain the CIE; this is called the mental-model hypothesis. This 
theory suggests that people create mental models of occurring events, and when a piece of 
information, like a retraction, challenges their existing view, a gap is formed. This gap leads to a 
version of the event that no longer makes sense unless the individual relies on the initial 
misinformation, making the invalid model more preferential than the incomplete one.  Second, 
Lewandowsky et al.(2012) report that that source-monitoring could also explain the CIE. That is, 
individuals might confuse or incorrectly attribute specific details of an event to the wrong source, 
leading to the continued use of the misinformation. For example, in a series of news reports 
about a crim, individuals could confuse false information from the first report with retraction 
information from a later one.  
Similar to research on the misinformation effect, research exploring the CIE has been 
heavily focused on experimental conditions that increase an individual’s susceptibility to the 
continued influence of misinformation, and it has been consistently found that two common 
factors can affect the strength of the CIE (Lewandowsky et al., 2012). First, the CIE is 
strengthened if the event is of high relevance to the individual (Johnson & Siefert, 1994; Jia et 
al., 2020). This may be explained by social judgement theory, which suggests that people find it 
more difficult to change their attitudes if their self-involvement in the topic is higher (Sherif et 
al., 1965).  
Second, when considering the type of retraction, it has been found that a simple, brief 
retraction strengthens the effect of the CIE, whereas a detailed retraction that contains an 
alternative explanation diminishes the effect (Swire et al., 2017; Johnson & Seifert, 1994). For 
example, a retraction that states “the police no longer consider X to be suspects, but they are now 
looking into Y because of Z” would be more effective than “the police no longer consider X to 
be suspects”. Additionally, the effectiveness of detail can also be applied to warnings against the 
CIE. Ecker et al. (2010) found that explicit detailed warnings that explained the effects of the 
CIE were significantly more likely to reduce participants’ reliance on misinformation than a brief 
general warning, although both did not completely eliminate the effect 
Despite the fact that the literature regarding when individuals become susceptible to the 
CIE and the misinformation effect is very extensive (see Loftus, 2005 and Lewandowsky et al., 
2012 for a review) the literature that explores who is susceptible to both effects is quite limited. 
First, researcheres concentrated their efforts on understanding the role of memory functions and 
its influence on the CIE (Brydges et al., 2018; Jia et al., 2020). Specifically, early studies in this 
area of research focused on individual differences in short-term and working memory. For 
example, Brydges et al. (2018) argued that if the CIE is caused by faulty memory processes, such 
as failing to integrate and update a mental model, then a person’s working and short-term 
memory capacity should predict their level of susceptibility to the CIE. Indeed, Brydges et al. 
(2018) found that participants who exhibited lower working memory capacity were slightly more 
likely to rely on the misinformation rather than the retraction when tested, thus producing a 
stronger CIE. These results suggest that when an individual has a limited working memory, they 
also have a limited ability to integrate and update their existing mental model of an event when 
they are faced with inconsistent information.  
Furthermore, Jia et al. (2020) expanded the findings of Brydges et al. (2018) on working 
memory by exploring the functions of the central executive and updating in connection to the 
CIE. The central executive function is central in controlling and regulating complicated cognitive 
processes, while the updating function is crucial in facilitating the integration of new information 
into mental models (Baddeley, 2003; Kendeou et al., 2013). Additionally, Jia et al. (2020) 
manipulated the relevance of the misinformation (high vs. low) to investigate their impact on 
misinformation effects. It was found that the strength of the CIE increased as central executive 
functioning decreased but only when participants were provided with highly relevant 
information. Updating on the other hand was only marginally correlated with the CIE, meaning 
that participants with better updating abilities relied slightly less on the misinformation, than 
participants with lower updating abilities. However, this was only significant for low-relevant 
information. These findings support Brydges et al. (2018) conclusion that working memory is a 
significant component of the CIE and can negatively impact a person’s susceptibility to 
misinformation effects. 
Another individual difference that has been researched in regard to false information is 
intelligence. Several studies exploring misinformation effects have reported findings that suggest 
as overall intelligence decreases, an individual’s vulnerability to false information increases 
(Eisen et al. 1998; Gudjonsson, 2003; Zhu et al., 2010). Unfortunately, little is known about 
whether intelligence would have the same effect in the context of the CIE. What is known 
however, originates from a study conducted by De keersmaecker and Roets (2017) in which they 
explored how cognitive ability, as measured using a 10-item subset from the Weschler Adult 
Intelligence Scale (WAIS), would affect an individual’s ability to adjust their attitudes after 
finding out that they were formed using false information. More specifically, participants were 
first presented with a picture of a woman and a false description about her character and were 
then asked to rate her on 8 dimensions (e.g., warm vs. cold). Participants were then informed that 
the description was incorrect and were instructed to rate her again. They found that participants 
who scored lower in cognitive ability were more likely to rely on the initial false description 
when making their second rating than participants who scored higher in cognitive ability. These 
findings indicate that there might be a relationship between intelligence and the CIE similar to 
that of intelligence and the misinformation effect however, as De keersmaecker and Roets (2017) 
suggest, this phenomenon needs to be explored in more detail. Additionally, they suggested that 
future researchers consider exploring the effects of divided intelligence (fluid vs. crystallized) 
and their individual influences on susceptibility to false information.   
In addition to overall intelligence, researchers have explored how personality traits 
influence an individual’s susceptibility to post-event misinformation. Frost et al. (2006) had 
participants watch a video which simulated an eyewitness event. Participants were then 
encouraged to fabricate events from the video in an interview and were offered varying types of 
feedback (confirmatory, neutral, or none). A week later, researchers found that participants who 
scored higher in extroversion on the Myers-Briggs Type Indicator (MBTI) and received 
confirmatory feedback were slightly more susceptible to these effects. Frost et al. (2006) 
theorized this is because extraverted individuals are more attentive to social cues and more 
concerned with their self-image than introverts, thus making them more likely to rely on 
confirmatory feedback even if it is wrong. Furthermore, Lai et al. (2020) also investigated the 
effect of the Big Five personality traits on susceptibility to false rumour belief in a national 
survey of 11,000 Chinese participants. In congruence with the findings of Frost et al. (2006) it 
was found that individuals who scored higher in extroversion and neuroticism exhibited the 
largest susceptibility to false rumors.  
In addition to their findings on extraversion and neuroticism, Frost et al. (2006) briefly 
touched on the thinking-feeling dimension and its impact on misinformation. It was originally 
hypothesized that feeling people (those who are more apt to think with their emotions rather than 
logic) were going to be more susceptible to misinformation effects than thinking people. Their 
findings supported their hypothesis; however, they recommend taking a closer look at the role of 
emotions to better understand why this phenomenon occurs. 
While there has been extensive work done to understand the mechanisms behind how 
experimental conditions and individual differences in memory affect susceptibility to the CIE, 
there are several lines of research still left to explore. Firstly, when it comes to intelligence, there 
has been little research to date that explicitly investigates the effects of intelligence within the 
context of the CIE. All studies have focused on the misinformation effect (false memories) or 
related constructs such as interrogative suggestibility and attitudes.  
Secondly, little is known about what specific functions of intelligence contribute to and 
maximize the effects of reliance on false information that has been subsequently retracted. One 
way to fill this gap is to explore Cattell’s (1943) theory of divided intelligence which proposes 
that the general intelligence of adults can be divided into two subsets: (a) fluid intelligence, 
which encompasses the basic processes of reasoning, problem solving, and thinking logically; 
and (2) crystallized intelligence, which refers to learned procedures and knowledge that reflect 
an individual’s experience and acculturation. Specifically examining the relationship between 
fluid intelligence and susceptibility to the CIE might be better suited as reasoning, problem 
solving, and logical thinking are all major mechanisms in the process of integrating new 
information and updating false information. Furthermore, these mechanisms have all been found 
to explain why the CIE occurs, making this an important line of research to explore 
(Lewandowsky et al., 2012).  
Another way to explore the specific functions of intelligence is to investigate the 
influence of emotional intelligence, which has been applied limitedly to the CIE. Emotional 
intelligence is defined as “a set of skills hypothesized to contribute to the accurate appraisal and 
expression of emotion in oneself and in others, the effective regulation of emotion in self and 
others, and the use of feelings to motivate, plan, and achieve in one's life” (Salovey & Mayor, 
1990). Salovey and Mayor (1990) claim that individuals with high levels of emotional 
intelligence can perceive emotions, use them in thought, understand their meaning, and manage 
emotions better than others. Exploring emotional intelligence might determine whether being in 
control of one’s emotions acts as a risk factor or a protective factor either increasing or 
decreasing vulnerability to the CIE.  
Lastly, there has been little research conducted on personality characteristics, specifically 
the Big Five personality traits, in the context of the CIE. As previously mentioned, some studies 
have found that extroverted individuals as well as those who score high in neuroticism are more 
likely to believe false rumours and be susceptible to misinformation effects (Frost et al., 2006; 
Lai et al., 2020), however some of these studies have used measures that are not valid, such as 
the MBTI. Exploring the Big Five in the context of the CIE could support previous findings in a 
new context with more validity.   
The current study aimed to further explore who is susceptible to the effects of 
misinformation and its continued use by shifting the focus from individual differences in 
memory to individual differences in intelligence and personality within the context of the CIE. 
Overall intelligence was broken down into more specific functions which were fluid intelligence, 
as indicated by abstract reasoning ability, and emotional intelligence. Furthermore, the Big Five 
personality traits (openness, conscientiousness, extroversion, agreeableness, and neuroticism) 
were also measured and assessed as predictors of the CIE.   
Participants read a fictional story, modelled after Ecker et al. (2014), which depicted the 
events of a housefire in London, Ontario. Following the paradigm designed by Wilkes and 
Leatherbarrow (1988), the news story contained both misinformation and a retraction. Reliance 
on the misinformation when answering an open-ended questionnaire about the news story 
determined the strength of the CIE for each participant. Furthermore, participants were asked to 
fill out three additional measures that collected information on personality traits, emotional 
intelligence, and abstract reasoning ability in that order. We expected individuals who scored 
lower in the Matrix Reasoning Abstract Item Bank task (MaRs-IB; Chierchia et al., 2019), which 
suggested a lower level of fluid intelligence, would rely more heavily on misinformation, and 
thus produce a larger CIE. Furthermore, individuals who had a stronger control over their 
emotions, thus scoring higher on Schutte’s Assessing Emotions Scale (SAES; Schutte et al., 
1998), would rely less on misinformation, therefore diminishing the strength of the CIE. 
Alternatively, individuals who had a lower ability to regulate their emotions, as defined by low 
scores on SAES, would be more likely to rely on emotions to guide their reasoning, resulting in a 
larger CIE. Last, we hypothesized that participants who scored higher on extraversion and 
neuroticism, as measured by the Interpersonal Adjectives Scale- Big Five (ISAR-B5; Trapnell & 
Wiggins, 1990), would be more susceptible to the effects of the CIE.  Due to the lack of 
literature regarding the association between the CIE and the other three Big Five personality 
factors (conscientiousness, agreeableness, and openness to experience) we did not speculate as to 




 Participants consisted of a small sample of 29 undergraduate students (27 females, 2 
males; age range 18 – 24; mean age 19.73 years) who were recruited using SONA, Brescia’s 
Psychology Research Participation System. All students in Psychology 1010A, 1015B, and 2855 
at Brescia University College were eligible to participate in this study. Participants were 
compensated for their participation in this study and earned one credit in their Psychology 
1010A, 1015B, or 2855 course at Brescia University College for participating. 
Materials  
 Participants were given a fictitious news report (see Appendix A) that was modelled after 
a news report used in Ecker et al.’s 2014 study that explored the effect of prejudice on the CIE. 
The news report consisted of 14 messages, each presented on a separate page in Qualtrics, that 
provided an account of a fictitious house fire in a suburb of London, Ontario. The news report 
was designed to elicit the CIE by providing participants with misinformation about the cause of 
the housefire and then later retracting that same misinformation. To be more specific, Message 5 
introduced the critical information that students at a frat party might have been the cause of the 
fire, while Message 11 introduced a police statement that states students were no longer suspects. 
Other factors such as reporting on information relevant to the sample, including a distractor 
period, and only providing a simple retraction as opposed to a detailed retraction with an 
alternative explanation were used to maximize the effect of the CIE.  
 Participants’ reliance on the misinformation provided in Message 5 was assessed using an 
open-ended questionnaire, also modelled after Ecker et al. (2014). The questionnaire consisted of 
9 inference questions, 8 fact-recall questions, and 2 retraction awareness questions. Inference 
questions required participants to make inferences about the circumstances surrounding the fire 
and were designed to evoke responses that were indirectly related to the original misinformation. 
For example, the question: “Why did the suspects appear to be wet?” could be answered by 
relying on misinformation (e.g., the suspects were at the beach-themed frat party next door) or 
could be answered by using factual details given in the news report (e.g., it was raining that 
night). Inference questions were given a score of 0 or 1. Any mention of students, the party, or 
anything that directly implied that students were the suspects of the house fire were counted as 
reference to the critical information in Message 5 and were be given a score of 1. Alternatively, 
all other answers were given a score of 0, resulting in a maximum inference score of 9, with 
higher scores indicating a larger CIE. It is important to note, that like Ecker’s study, one 
inference question (“Who do you think the suspects were?”) was placed at the end of the fact-
recall section so that it appeared to be a recall question, however it was scored as an inference 
question.  
 Fact-recall questions were used to test how much of the factual details given throughout 
the news report participants remembered. An example of a fact-recall question is: “On what 
night did the housefire occur?”. Fact-recall questions were scored 1 for correct responses and 0 
for incorrect responses, resulting in a maximum fact-recall score of 8. The two retraction-
awareness questions were used to assess participants’ memory of the retraction given in Message 
11 and were scored 1 if participants remembered the retraction and 0 if they did not. Thus, the 
maximum retraction-awareness score was 2.  
 The IASR-B5 is a scale designed by Trapnell & Wiggins (1990) to measure each of the 
Big Five personality traits (neuroticism, openness to experience, agreeableness, 
conscientiousness, and extroversion) by asking participants to rate whether a series of single 
adjectives accurately reflect their own typical behaviour on an 8-point Likert scale with “1” 
being extremely inaccurate and “8” being extremely accurate. For this study, a total of 25 
adjectives, five for each trait, were chosen from the original 92 with each adjective exceeding a 
factor weight of ±.50.  
Emotional intelligence was measured using Schutte’s Assessing Emotions Scale (Schutte 
et al., 1998). The measure contains 33-items and required participants to read a single statement 
(e.g., “I know when to speak about my personal problems to others.”) and assess how much they 
self-identified with that statement on a 5-point Likert scale ranging from strongly disagree to 
strongly agree. Scores could range from 33 – 165, with higher scores indicating a higher level of 
emotional intelligence.  
The MaRs-IB is an open-access 80-item measure of abstract reasoning designed by 
Chierchia et al. (2019). Thirty items, varying in difficulty, were chosen from the original 80 to be 
used in this study. Each item consists of an incomplete 3x3 matrix with abstract shapes in each 
cell. Participants were provided with four images and were asked to choose the image that 
completes the matrix. To complete this task participants must have deduced relationships and 
patterns across the eight cells of the original matrix, thus making their overall accuracy a good 
indicator of their ability to use abstract reasoning, which in turn, provided an indirect insight into 
their level of fluid intelligence 
Procedure 
 Participants began by signing up for the study on SONA, Brescia’s Psychology Research 
Participation System. Once students signed into SONA, they were able to see the title of this 
study and a research description outlining the research question and procedures. After they 
selected this study and sign-up was completed, a link was provided. When clicked, the link took 
students directly to the Qualtrics website where the survey was hosted.  
 Once the survey began, participants were asked to read the fictitious news report. 
Following the news report, participants provided demographic information and then completed 
the personality inventory (IASR-B5). Next, participants answered an open-ended questionnaire 
about the news report followed by the emotional intelligence scale (Assessing Emotions Scale), 
and then the abstract reasoning task (MaRs-IB). Finally, participants were provided with a 
debrief form explaining the purpose of the study.  
Results 
The mean inference score was 3.53 (SD = 1.50), with the maximum possible score being 
9. The mean fact-recall score was 4.54 (SD = 1.82), with a maximum possible score of 8, and the 
mean retraction-awareness score was 0.57 (SD = 0.63), with the maximum possible score of 2.  
To explore the relationship between the strength of the CIE and individual differences, a 
Pearson correlation was conducted between the outcome variable – inference scores – and the 
predictor variables: openness (M = 27.62, SD = 5.72), conscientiousness (M = 28.45, SD = 5.05), 
neuroticism (M = 26.38, SD = 6.13) , extraversion (M = 24.00, SD = 5.60), agreeableness (M = 
30.79, SD = 5.01), emotional intelligence (M = 126.21, SD = 16.38), and abstract reasoning (M = 
20.26, SD = 8.48).  
Results indicated that there were no significant correlations between any of the Big Five 
personality traits and inference scores. Neuroticism, r(25) = .10, p = .605, agreeableness, r(25) = 
.06, p = .733, and openness, r(25)=.32, p = .100, extraversion, r(25) = -.09, p = .635, 
conscientiousness, r(25) = .07, p = .724, did not correlate with inference scores and were not 
significant. Additionally, emotional intelligence did not correlate with inference scores, r(26) - 
.17, p = .397, suggesting no relationship between emotional intelligence and strength of the CIE. 
Last, the correlation between abstract reasoning and inference scores was analyzed and results 
demonstrated a non-significant relationship between the two variables, indicating that a 
participant’s ability to utilize abstract reasoning did not influence the strength of the CIE, r(25)=-
.14, p = .485. 
To analyze whether individual differences were predictors of susceptibility to the CIE a 
multiple regression analysis was conducted. The overall model accounted for 19% of the 
variance in inference scores and was non-significant, R2 = .19, F(7, 19) = .65, p = .710. It was 
found that openness, extraversion, conscientiousness, agreeableness, and neuroticism were not 
significant predictors of susceptibility to the CIE. Furthermore, emotional intelligence and 
abstract reasoning were also not significant enough to predict susceptibility to false information.  
Secondary analyses revealed a moderate, positive, significant correlation between 
inference scores and fact-recall scores, r(26) = .58, p = .001, demonstrating that as participant’s 
fact-recall scores increased, their inference scores increased as well (see Figure 1). When 
regressed with the other predictors, fact-recall scores were found to significantly predict 
inference scores, β = .59, p =.004. Additionally, a moderate, positive, significant correlation was 
found between abstract reasoning scores and retraction-awareness scores, r(25) = .46, p = .015, 
which illustrates that participants who scored higher in abstract reasoning, were more likely to be 
aware of the retraction (see Figure 2). 
 
Figure 1 
Association Between Inference Scores and Fact-Recall Scores  
Note. The correlation between inference scores and fact-recall scores is shown. Results revealed a revealed a 
moderate, positive, significant correlation between the two variables suggesting that participants who were more 
susceptible to the effects of the CIE were also more likely to remember the facts of the news story. 
Discussion 
Overall, the results did not support any of the anticipated hypotheses. First, it was 
hypothesized that participants who scored lower on the MaRs-IB abstract reasoning task, which 
suggested a lower level of fluid intelligence, would be more likely to rely on the initial 
misinformation, thus producing a larger CIE. Results indicated that a participant’s score on the 
MaRs-IB task was neither significantly correlated with nor predictive of their inference scores, 
suggesting that a participant’s ability to reason, problem solve, and think logically did not make 
them more vulnerable to the CIE. Second, it was hypothesized that as emotional intelligence 
scores increased on the SAES, inference scores would decrease, and thus emotional intelligence  
 























Association Between Abstract Reasoning Scores and Retraction-Awareness Scores 
Note. The correlation between abstract reasoning scores and retraction-awareness scores is shown. Results revealed 
a revealed a moderate, positive, significant correlation between the two variables, suggesting that participants who 
had a higher level of abstract reasoning were more likely to remember the retraction.  
would protect against vulnerability to the CIE. It was found that participant’s emotional 
intelligence did not determine whether they would be more or less likely to rely on the false 
information provided in the news story. Last, it was hypothesized that individuals who scored 
high in neuroticism and extroversion would produce a larger CIE effect, however results 
indicated that there was no significant relationship between these two personality traits and the 
size of the CIE. Additionally, conscientiousness, agreeableness, and openness to experience were 
also not indicative of whether participants were more or less likely to be vulnerable to the effects 
of the CIE. 
Secondary analyses revealed that a participant’s fact-recall score was significantly related 
to and predictive of their inference score. This suggests that the more facts about the news story 


























participants remembered the more likely they were to rely on the misinformation, thus creating a 
larger CIE effect. One explanation for this finding is that participants were so focused on 
memorizing the facts of the story for later questioning, that they were less attentive to the 
retraction, thus relying more heavily on the initial misinformation. Furthermore, it was found that 
a participant’s abstract reasoning score was significantly correlated with their retraction-
awareness score. This means participants who scored higher in abstract reasoning, which 
suggests a higher level of fluid intelligence, were more likely to report remembering the 
retraction and what it was about.  
These results both fit and contrast with the existing literature in several ways. First, the 
lack of relationship between abstract reasoning and inference scores suggests that fluid 
intelligence neither increases nor decreases susceptibility to the CIE. These results are consistent 
with a small number of studies that have found no significant association between intelligence 
and misinformation effects (Salthouse & Siedlecki, 2007; Powers et al. 1983). Second, the 
significant relationship between abstract reasoning scores and retraction-awareness scores 
suggests that there might be a connection between fluid intelligence and the CIE. That is, 
individuals who are better at abstract reasoning and thus have a higher level of fluid intelligence, 
are more likely to pay attention to and remember retractions. These findings are more consistent 
with the previous studies on intelligence and misinformation discussed earlier (Eisen et al., 1998; 
Gudjonsson, 1983; Zhu et al., 2010; De keersmaecker & Roets, 2017). 
 Third, the findings on the effect of personality traits on the CIE contrast with the existing 
literature. For example, earlier studies found that highly neurotic and extroverted individuals 
were more likely to be vulnerable to false rumors and memories (Frost et al., 2006; Lai et al., 
2020), whereas our results suggest that there is a no connection between personality traits and the 
CIE. This discrepancy might be because the misinformation effect and the CIE are different 
phenomena, therefore the way personality traits impact vulnerability to the misinformation 
effect, as demonstrated in the literature, might not impact vulnerability to the CIE in the same 
way. Furthermore, the discrepancy between our results and the literature could be due to several 
methodological limitations, such as not achieving a strong enough continued influence effect. 
 Last, the results that suggest emotional intelligence neither increases nor decreases 
susceptibility to the CIE, is a new contribution to the literature. Little is known about how 
emotional intelligence interacts with the CIE, however research on emotional intelligence 
suggests that being in control of one’s emotions might protect against false information effects 
such as the CIE (Frost et al., 2006; Salvoy & Mayor, 1998). It is suggested that future 
researchers continue to examine the effects of emotional intelligence to better understand its 
impact on susceptibility to false information effects.  
 There are several methodological limitations that should be taken into consideration. 
First, is that the sample size was small. A power analysis with an alpha level of .05 and a power 
level of 0.80 revealed that the projected sample size needed to produce a medium effect size was 
approximately 103 participants (Zhang & Yuan, 2018). However, due to time constraints and 
participant recruiting we were only able to achieve an inadequate sample size of 29. Having a 
larger sample size might have revealed additional information that was not gleaned from the 
current sample size. Second, designing a novel news story while still modelling that of Ecker et 
al. (2014) may have diminished the size of the CIE rather than maximizing it. This resulted in a 
low inference scores and a small CIE effect, which may have impacted our results. It might be 
more effective in the future for researchers to utilize the exact news story and questionnaire used 
in several previous studies (Wilkes & Leatherbarrow, 1988; Ecker et al., 2011, 2014; Johnson & 
Seifert, 1994) to achieve a larger CIE effect. Last, the type of population we tested might have 
created ceiling effects for the abstract reasoning task. More specifically, we tested a population 
that might have had an intellectual advantage due to the nature of the post-secondary 
environment which resulted in a large number of participants having extreme scores. Therefore, 
testing a population with a range of intelligences that did not reflect the general population may 
have impacted the how the relationship between the CIE and fluid intelligence turned out.  
 It is suggested that researchers continue to examine the relationship between divided 
intelligence and the CIE by using different measures. Due to cost and copyright constraints a 
fairly new open-access measure (MaRs-IB) was used to indirectly measure fluid intelligence. 
Future researchers could use a more well-established measure of fluid intelligence such as 
Raven’s Progressive Matrices, which is well-known to be an effective and culture free measure 
of fluid intelligence. Additionally, if future research demonstrates that there is a negative 
relationship between intelligence and false information in the context of the CIE, it would be 
interesting to see how individuals with varying levels of intelligence respond to different types of 
warnings that caution against false information. Last, it is suggested that future research continue 
to explore how an individual’s use and management of their emotions increases or decreases 
vulnerability to the CIE.  
 This current research aimed to examine fluid intelligence, as measured by abstract 
reasoning, emotional intelligence, and the Big Five personality traits as predictors of the CIE. 
The analyses revealed that all three predictor variables were not significantly correlated with or 
predictive of susceptibility to the CIE. Considering that the spreading of misinformation has 
become highly prominent in public society and that it has become increasingly easier to spread 
through modern technology, such as social media, the study of false information and its 
relationship with individual differences has become highly relevant. By seeking to identify and 
understand which individuals are most susceptible to the persisting effects of false information, 
the current study attempts to better understand how incorrect information can impact modern day 
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